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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of corporate governance on intellectual capital disclosure in corporate annual reports, controlling for other firm characteristics. Intellectual capital is increasingly recognised as having much greater significance in creating and maintaining competitive advantage and shareholder value (Tayles et al., 2007) . Definitions of intellectual capital vary (for example, Stewart, 1997; Mouritsen, 1998) . One of the most comprehensive definitions of intellectual capital is offered by CIMA (2001) : '… the possession of knowledge and experience, professional knowledge and skill, good relationships, and technological capacities, which when applied will give organisations competitive advantage. ' Sveiby (1997) suggests that the concept of intellectual capital can be categorised into human, structural and organisational capital, while Guthrie and Petty (2000) offer an alternative categorisation: internal structure, external structure and human capital. The various forms of intellectual capital disclosure are valuable information for investors as they help reduce uncertainty about future prospects and facilitate a more precise valuation of the company (Bukh, 2003) . However, financial reports fail to reflect such a wide range of value-creating intangible assets (Lev and Zarowin, 1999) , giving rise to increasing information asymmetry between firms and users (Barth et al., 2001) , and creating inefficiencies in the resource allocation process within capital markets. A number of research reports (e.g. FASB, 2001; ASB, 2007) and academic studies (e.g. Lev, 2001; Mouritsen et al., 2001 ) have called for greater disclosure of non-financial indicators of investment in intangible assets. Cañibano et al. (2000) argue that the cost associated with a radical change in the accounting system to make it more value relevant for intellectual capital intensive firms is unaffordable and that the sensible approach towards the enhancement of financial reports is to encourage voluntary disclosure of intellectual capital information. Keenan and Aggestam (2001) argue that responsibility for the prudent investment of intellectual capital resides with corporate governance, and that, depending on the firm's characteristics and orientation, the governance of publicly-owned firms may need to develop new structures and processes in annual reports for communicating information about the value created for stakeholders through the firm's intellectual capital. However, as discussed in a later section, the empirical evidence from prior studies is limited, with small sample sizes prohibiting more rigorous statistical analysis and external validity. For example, we know very little about the main determinants of the variation in levels of intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports across firms, including the effects of good governance mechanisms.
This paper examines the influence of corporate governance factors on intellectual capital disclosure, and the subcategories comprising it, using various disclosure measures. We hypothesise that significant relationships exist between intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports and board composition, role duality, ownership concentration, audit committee size and frequency of audit com-mittee meetings, controlling for listing age, firm size and profitability. Using content analysis and regressing the three forms of intellectual capital disclosure measures on the explanatory variables, we find support for all hypotheses with the exception of role duality.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the empirical literature on intellectual capital disclosure. The hypothesis development is outlined in Section 3, followed by the research design in Section 4. Section 5 presents findings on intellectual capital disclosure practices from multiple regression analyses, and examines the working hypotheses. Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings, implications and limitations of the study.
Literature on intellectual capital disclosure studies
Information on intellectual capital is important to stakeholders in their decision-making. Within an agency context, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that greater disclosure reduces the uncertainty facing investors and thus reduces a firm's cost of capital. Managers should therefore be willing to disclose intellectual capital information in order to enhance the firm's value by providing investors with a better assessment of the financial position of the firm and help reduce the volatility of stock returns. Barth et al. (2001) observe that analyst coverage is greater for firms investing more heavily in research and development and advertising, while empirical studies suggest a positive share price impact arises from specific intellectual capital indicators such as research and development (R&D) expenditure (Amir and Lev, 1996) , capitalisation of software development expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 1998) , and customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larker, 1998) . Gibbins et al. (1990) explore the voluntary disclosure process giving rise to disclosure outputs in response to internal and external stimuli. They argue that a company's readiness to disclose is a function of its general disclosure position (for example, an uncritical adherence to information disclosure norms or to use disclosure as opportunity to gain advantage or boost stock price), antecedents (for example, corporate history, corporate strategy, and market factors), structure, and the use of consultants and advisors. While corporate governance mechanisms are not specifically identified, they have relevance to all these independent variables, particularly to structure, where governance involves the establishing of clear policies. Abeysekera (2006) observes that the development of a theoretical framework underlying intellectual capital disclosure is in its infancy, with few studies providing a strong theoretical basis for interpreting their findings. However, the literature offers a few theoretical perspectives that may help explain the variation of intellectual capital disclosure. These include arguments based on legitimacy and stakeholders (Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005) , signalling , media agenda setting (Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007) , agency (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007) , and information asymmetry (Amir and Lev, 1996) .
In a review of the current state of financial and external reporting research, Parker (2007) identified intellectual capital accounting as a major area for further research. Most intellectual capital disclosure studies are cross-sectional and country specific. Examples include studies in Australia (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007) , Ireland (Brennan, 2001) , Italy (e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2003) , Malaysia (Goh and Lim, 2004) , UK (e.g. Williams, 2001), and Canada (Bontis, 2003) . Relatively few longitudinal studies have been reported (e.g. Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005) . Some studies focus on specific aspects of intellectual capital disclosure, such as human capital reporting (e.g. Subbarao and Zeghal, 1997) , while others conduct international comparative studies (e.g. Vergauwen and van Alem, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007) . Some intellectual capital disclosure studies have looked beyond annual reports to examine other communication channels such as analyst presentations .
Most intellectual capital disclosure studies employ content analysis as the research method, but some use questionnaire surveys (e.g. Bontis, 1998). Guthrie and Petty's (2000) analysis of intellectual capital reporting practices suggests that disclosure has been expressed in discursive rather than numerical terms and that little attempt has been made to translate the rhetoric into measures that enable performance of various forms of intellectual capital to be evaluated.
Studies have also been conducted to explore intellectual capital related issues from the firm's perspective. Chaminade and Roberts (2003) investigate the implementation of intellectual capital reporting systems in Norway and Spain. Habersam and Piper (2003) employ case studies to explore the relevance and awareness of intellectual capital in hospitals. Studies that looked at possible determinants of voluntary intellectual capital disclosure include and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) . Based on analyst presentation reports of listed Spanish companies, found significant association between intellectual capital disclosure and size and type of disclosure meeting but not ownership diffusion, international listing status, industry type and profitability. Based on analysis of European Biotechnology companies over a period of three years, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) 138 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH found governance related variables to strongly influence voluntary intellectual capital disclosure. In the UK, there has been a limited number of intellectual capital disclosure studies compared to its European counterparts. Williams (2001) conducted a cross-sectional study of 31 companies while Beattie et al. (2002) undertook a study of 11 companies in the food sector. The small sample sizes restrict generalisation and meaningful interpretation of intellectual capital disclosure. Roslender and Fincham (2004) explore intellectual capital awareness among UK firms, and the reasons and motives underlying such interest.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the literature on the determinants of intellectual capital disclosure is limited and inconclusive. Our study builds on the previous literature of intellectual capital disclosure practice within a UK context and examines its relationship with corporate governance structures, listing age, profitability and size.
Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure and development of hypotheses

Corporate governance mechanisms
Corporate governance is a framework of legal, institutional, and cultural factors shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision-making (Weimer and Pape, 1999) . The justification for considering corporate governance is that the board of directors manages information disclosure in annual reports and therefore constituents of boards may be important. Holland (2006a: 147) found that boards of directors are at the heart of corporate financial communications, having active roles in the disclosure process related to: (1) the provision of primary information regarding the corporate value-creation process, and their contribution towards it; (2) the provision of information about themselves in terms of their skills in managing the business; (3) the manner in which they are organised to conduct financial communications; (4) their reputation for disclosure honesty; and (5) information about how their own pay and wealth is tied to company fortunes.
Agency theory provides a framework for linking voluntary disclosure behaviour to corporate governance, whereby control mechanisms are designed to reduce the agency problem arising from the separation between ownership and management (Welker, 1995) . This argument can be extended to intellectual capital disclosure, whereby management can determine the level of disclosure and thereby reduce investor uncertainty relating to the impact of intellectual capital on the firm's value. High intellectual capital disclosure is therefore expected to provide a more intensive monitoring package for a firm to reduce opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry.
Adoption of internal control devices, such as audit committees and non-executive directors, and separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive, may enhance monitoring quality in critical decisions about intellectual capital investment and performance (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001) . This is likely to reduce the scope for managerial opportunism and reduce benefits from withholding information, and, as a consequence, intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports should be improved.
Board composition -proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED)
The board of directors is an internal control mechanism intended to take decisions on behalf of the shareholders and to ensure that management behaviour is consistent with owners' interests. Based on resource dependence theory, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) argue for more non-executive directors on the board as they can provide wider expertise, prestige and contacts, and play a key role in influencing disclosure. Extending this argument, and that of Gibbins et al. (1990) , to intellectual capital, we suggest that the wider expertise and experience of non-executive directors on the board will encourage management to take a disclosure position beyond a ritualistic, uncritical adherence to prescribed norms, to a more proactive position reflecting the value relevance of intellectual capital to stakeholders.
Findings from prior voluntary disclosure studies that considered board composition as a possible determinant of voluntary disclosure are mixed; some find that the proportion of non-executive directors is positively related with the board's ability to influence voluntary disclosure decisions (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Chen and Jaggi, 2000) , others find no relationship (Ho and Wong, 2001; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006) , and yet others observe a negative relationship (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . One reason may be that non-executive directors are not necessarily independent. Independent non-executive directors are typically individuals with relevant expertise and professional reputations to defend, with no management role or links with the company. 1 Cotter and Silvester Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 139 1 The revised Combined Code (2006) recommends that at least half of the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent as defined by criteria in the Code, in order that non-executive directors are able to discharge their responsibilities in an objective manner, without interference, bias or favouritism. For example, a director should not have been an employee of the group within the last five years, had a material business relationship with the company within the last three years, received additional remuneration from the company apart from a director's fee, participate in the company's share option or a performance-related pay scheme, close family ties with any of the company's advisers, directors or senior employees, hold cross-directorships or significant links with directors, or served on the board for more than nine years. (2003) argue that independent non-executive directors are in a better position to monitor executive management. In one of the few studies capturing independent non-executive directors, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) found a positive correlation with the amount of voluntary information disclosed by companies in their annual reports. We also capture independent non-executive directors (INED) and argue that:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure and the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board, ceteris paribus.
Role duality (RDUAL)
Another way to examine independence of the board is to consider role duality, a board leadership structure in which the same person undertakes both the roles of chief executive and chairman. 2 There is widespread acknowledgement that a dominant personality commanding a firm may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, and this phenomenon has been found to be associated with poor disclosure (Forker, 1992) and CEO entrenchment, resulting in ineffective monitoring of managerial opportunistic behaviour (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . Concentration of decision-making power resulting from role duality could impair the board's oversight and governance roles, including disclosure policies. Separation of the two roles provides the essential checks and balances on management behaviour (Blackburn, 1994) , as recommended in the revised Combined Code (2006) . 3 Employing similar arguments for role duality as for independent non-executives, we hypothesise that:
H2: There is a negative relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure and role duality, ceteris paribus.
Ownership structure -share concentration (SCON)
The power of stakeholders to influence management is a function of the resources they control that are essential to the corporation (Smith et al., 2005) . Ownership structure therefore will influence the level of monitoring and thereby the level of voluntary disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003) . Agency theory argues that with greater ownership diffusion, firms are more likely to experience pressure from shareholders for greater disclosure to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry (Raffournier, 1995) . In contrast, firms with closely-held ownership are expected to have less information asymmetry between management and dominant shareholders who typically have access to the information they need and can provide an active governance system that is difficult for smaller, more passive and less-informed investors (Cormier et al., 2005) . 4 This is particularly relevant to intellectual capital disclosure because fund managers have access to such information via private communication channels (Holland, 2006b ). Hence, we hypothesise that:
H3: There is a negative relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure and concentrated share ownership, ceteris paribus.
Audit committee size (SAC) and frequency of meetings (MAC)
Board monitoring is a function of not only the structure and composition of the board, but also of the board's subcommittees where much of the important processes and decisions are monitored and taken (Cotter and Silvester, 2003) . The role of audit committees has developed over the years to meet the challenges of changing business, social and economic environments. The Smith Report (2003) in the UK identifies the role of audit committees as ensuring that the interests of shareholders are properly protected in relation to financial reporting and internal control. It further recommends audit committees to review the significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection with the preparation of the company's financial statements, interim reports, preliminary announcements and related formal statements, such as the operating and financial review and the release of price-sensitive information. As such, audit committees can be expected to have a significant impact on value-relevant information disclosure, of which intellectual capital forms a large element in many firms.
Effective audit committees should improve internal control and act as a means of attenuating agency costs (Ho and Wong, 2001) , and as a powerful monitoring device for improving value-relevant intellectual capital disclosure. The presence of an audit committee has been found to be associated with more reliable financial reporting 140 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 2 Role duality is not common among listed companies since the majority comply with the recommended code of corporate governance.
3 However, in voluntary disclosure studies, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) failed to find any relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure and role duality. 4 Prior disclosure studies provide mixed evidence. Cormier et al. (2005) and Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find significant negative associations between ownership concentration and engagement in environmental reporting practices. Patelli and Prencipe (2007) find a positive relationship between share ownership diffusion and voluntary disclosure. However, Eng and Mak (2003) fail to find any significant association between blockholder ownership and voluntary disclosure. (McMullen, 1996) , enhanced quality and increased disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001 ). However, Mangena and Pike (2005) find no relationship between audit committee size and the extent of voluntary disclosure in interim reports. Inactive audit committees are unlikely to monitor management effectively and adequate meeting time should be devoted to the consideration of major issues (Olson, 1999) . Price Waterhouse (1993) recommended that audit committees should hold a minimum of three or four meetings a year and special meetings when necessary.
Given the increasing importance of intellectual capital, we expect larger audit committees, meeting more frequently, to have greater influence in overseeing intellectual capital disclosure practice. Therefore, our next two hypotheses are as follows:
H4: There is a positive relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure and audit committee size, ceteris paribus.
H5:
There is a positive relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure and frequency of audit committee meetings, ceteris paribus.
Control variables
The length of time a company has been listed on a capital market (AGE) may be relevant in explaining the variation of disclosures. Younger listed companies without an established shareholder base are expected to be more reliant on external fund raising than more mature companies (Barnes and Walker, 2006) and have greater need to reduce scepticism and boost investor confidence (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002) . Hence, we expect a negative relationship between firms' listing age and level of intellectual capital disclosure. Profitability (ROA) may be the result of continuous investment in intellectual capital and firms may engage in higher disclosure of such information to signal the significance of their decision in investing in it for longterm growth in the value of the firm. We therefore expect a positive relationship between profitability and level of intellectual capital disclosure. Large firms are more visible and more likely to meet investors' demand for information and we expect a positive relationship between size of company (SA) and level of intellectual capital disclosure.
Research method
Sampling design
This study examines intellectual capital disclosure in corporate annual reports of UK fully listed companies on the London Stock Exchange 5 This provided us with a population size of 319 companies, from which a sample size of 100 was selected (31%). As the number of companies in each industry group is not the same, proportionate stratified sampling was applied (Moser and Kalton, 1996) .
Development of the research instrument
Content analysis was used to collect the necessary data. An essential element of content analysis is the selection and development of categories into which content units can be classified. Various authors (e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Meritum, 2002) suggest that intellectual capital can be grouped into three subcategories: (1) Human capital, for example, staff education, training, experience, knowledge and skills, (2) Structural capital, covering internal structures such as R&D, patents, management processes, and (3) Relational capital, covering external relationships such as customer relations, brands and reputation. These forms of intellectual capital can be leveraged to create competitive advantage and value for stakeholders. However, Beattie and Thomson (2007) observe that there is no consensus or precise definition of the constituents of such categories, giving rise to difficulties for annual report preparers and researchers seeking to quantify intellectual capital disclosure. Habersam and Piper (2003) argue for a comprehensive representation of intellectual capital, including metric and non-metric forms, in order to better discern its different dimensions and degrees of transparency. They further suggest a fourth intellectual capital category, namely 'Connectivity Capital' linking the other three forms.
The categories and items in our research instrument were drawn from previous literature on intellectual capital definition and classification. The majority of previous intellectual capital disclosure studies have adopted or adapted Sveiby's (1997) intellectual capital framework, which typically contains 22-25 items (Beattie and Thomson, 2007) . The problem with too few coding categories is that it potentially increases the likelihood of random agreement in coding decisions and subsequently results in an overestimation of reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999) . Similarly, higher numbers of items in the instrument increase the complexity (Beattie and Thomson, 2007) and may potentially increase coding errors (i.e. reliability) (Milne and Adler, 1999) . However, in order to achieve greater variation and better understanding of intellectual capital disclosure, we devised a Vol. 38 No. 2. 2008 141 more detailed checklist covering items relating to the three themes: human capital (HIC), structural capital (SIC) and relational capital (RIC), capturing information in the forms of text, numerical and graphical/pictorial. While Guthrie and Petty (2000) highlight the difficulty in seeking to quantify the qualitative aspects of intellectual capital, evidence from Habersam and Piper (2003) questions this view. All items in the designed research instrument were considered equally applicable and therefore equally capable of disclosure across all sample firms in all three formats. The initial draft of the research instrument with 150 items was pilot tested by one researcher, using a sample of annual reports (not included in the final sample). Based on feedback from the pilot test and discussion with two other researchers, the instrument was further modified to ensure that it captured the necessary and desired information for which it was designed. The research instrument was reduced to 61 intellectual capital items in three forms. The operational definitions and coding rules (see Appendix) were defined by one researcher and checked and agreed by the other two researchers.
Measurement of dependent variables
Beattie and Thomson (2007) argue that many of the content analysis research methods adopted in prior studies for intellectual capital disclosure measurement lack transparency, specificity, uniformity and rigour, and that these deficiencies may give rise to misleading evidence. In this study, scoring of the research instrument was performed manually covering the whole annual report. 6 The dependent variable, intellectual capital disclosure, is measured using three different metrics: disclosure index (ICDI) to indicate the variety; word count (ICWC) to represent the volume; and word count as a percentage of annual report total word count (ICWC%) to indicate focus in the annual report. Our approach in scoring the items in the research instrument for the purpose of the disclosure index is essentially dichotomous in that an item scores one if disclosed and zero, if it is not.
7
The intellectual capital disclosure index ICDI j for each company is calculated based on the disclosure index score formula used in Haniffa and Cooke (2005) as follows:
where n j = number of items for j th firm, n j = 183 (i.e. 61 items in three formats), X ij = 1 if i th item disclosed, 0 if i th item not disclosed, so that 0 ≤ ICDI j ≤ 1.
The use of a dichotomous procedure in scoring the instrument for the disclosure index can be criticised because it treats disclosure of one item (regardless of its form or content) as being equal, and does not indicate how much emphasis is given to a particular content category. To capture the volume of intellectual capital content and to partly overcome the problem of using an index score, this study introduces another form of measure, namely intellectual capital word count (ICWC). Words are the smallest unit of measurement for analysis and can be expected to provide the maximum robustness to the study in assessing the quantity of disclosure (Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990) . Using the same research instrument, and taking 'phrases ', or what Beattie and Thomson (2007) term 'pieces of information' as the basis of coding, the number of words relating to each intellectual capital item in the checklist was counted and added together to arrive at ICWC for each company. Graphical and pictorial messages were excluded from the word count measure. 8 Coding under 'phrases' and word count avoids the problem of coding sentences in terms of decisions over dominant themes, and the 'phrases' remain meaningful in their own right, while enabling the measuring of the amount of information provided. Coding annual reports into 'phrases' is a three-stage process involving: (1) selection of sentences containing intellectual capital information; (2) splitting such sentences into 'phrases' and selecting only those relating to intellectual capital; and (3) coding 'phrases' under each relevant item(s) in the research instrument. Where a 142 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 6 Three coders independently coded the same four annual reports and Krippendorff's (1980) alpha was used to test for reliability as it can account for chance agreement among multiple coders. The independent scores were all above the minimum 80% threshold for content analysis to be considered reliable (Riffe et al., 2005) and this was achieved after a second round of independently coding another four annual reports. Only one researcher completed the coding for the remaining 92 annual reports. To aid consistency of scoring, the research instrument was completed by one researcher, and to increase reliability of measurement, rescoring was done on a random selection of 10 firms three months after initial analysis, which confirmed over 90% consistent identification of content in the annual reports.
7 Many prior intellectual capital disclosure studies have adopted the dichotomous (0:1) coding scheme in measuring intellectual capital disclosure, which is mainly for examining the presence/absence of intellectual capital items (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 2001) . Some intellectual capital disclosure studies used weighted coding schemes, which give uneven scores for quantitative and qualitative information (e.g. Bozzolan, et al., 2003; Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007) . Consistent with Cooke (1989), items were not weighted because of potential scoring bias and scaling problems.
8 Beattie and Thomson (2007) identify the problems with word count (such as print size, colour, font variations and disclosures in graphs/pictures format), and propose a measure addressing the differentiation in length and number of sentences used in expressing similar meanings encountered by coding sentences.
'phrase' relates to more than one item in the checklist and cannot be split, it is then coded under all the related items and the word count is evenly distributed across all the items coded. An example is shown as follows, 'The trust and confidence of all our stakeholders, together with our reputation, are among our most valuable assets.' (AstraZeneca plc 2004 Annual report).
The sentence was split into three 'phrases': (1) The trust and confidence of all our stakeholders, (2) together with our reputation, (3) are among our most valuable asset. Phrase 1 was coded under 'relationship with stakeholders', phrase 2 was coded under 'company reputation' and phrase 3 was equally distributed between the two items. Krippendorff (1980) further notes that words are a preferred measure when it is intended to measure the amount of total space devoted to a topic and to ascertain the importance of that topic. Although word count is not assumed to be representative of the quality of disclosure, it is assumed to be indicative of the overall responsiveness by corporate management. 9 The greater the number of words related to intellectual capital being disclosed in relation to the total number of words in the annual reports, the greater the emphasis given by management on intellectual capital information. Hence, we introduced a third measure, ICWC%, which is the proportion of intellectual capital word count to the total word count of the whole annual report. This measure captures the intellectual capital focus in the annual report. For example, a firm with a short annual report may have a low ICDI and ICWC but a high ICWC%, conveying to the reader the importance placed by management on intellectual capital information.
Measurement of independent variables
The independent variables are categorised into two groups: corporate governance and control variables. Data are drawn from corporate annual reports and Thomson Research. Table 1 summarises the operationalisation of both independent and dependent variables.
Data analysis
Multiple regression is used to test the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure (based on each of the three measures) and the various corporate governance and control variables. To identify potential multicollinearity problems, the correlations between independent variables were reviewed and the variance inflation factors (VIF) computed. In addition, tests were conducted for normality, based on skewness and kurtosis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors (for goodness of fit), for all dependent and continuous independent variables and when normality was a problem, the data was transformed. 10 An analysis of residuals, plots of the studentised residuals against predicted values as well as the Q-Q plot were conducted to test for homoscedasticity, linearity and normality assumptions. The regression equation is as follows: This assumption is based on the belief that management has editorial control of content when a large number of demands for inclusion of information are likely to exist. Annual reports are time-consuming and costly to produce, and management must rationalise the competing demands for space. As a result space must be allocated on the basis of some perception of the importance of information to report users. 10 The standard tests for skewness and kurtosis revealed that share concentration, listing age and firm size were not normally distributed. Appropriate transformations were conducted to ensure data normality. Listing age and firm size were transformed using logarithmic transformation, whereas square root transformation was more effective for share concentration. Table 2 presents the correlation and partial correlation matrices (controlling for log of sales, a proxy for size).
11
It can be seen from both panel A and B of Table 2 that all variables showed significance for at least one intellectual capital disclosure measure. Table 2 , Panel A reveals that, with the exception of log of firm size, independent variable associations are all below 0.30. The VIFs for each independent variable (shown in Table 6 ) are all less than 2, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem.
12
Panel B of Table 2 reveals no multicollinearity among explanatory variables after controlling for size. It can also be seen from Panel B of Table 2 that board composition (INED) shows significant association with all measures of intellectual capital disclosure. Size of audit committee (SAC), frequency of audit committee meetings (MAC), and share concentration (SqSCON), show highly significant (1% and 5% levels) association with ICDI and log of ICWC, but not with ICWC%. Return on assets (ROA) and log of listing age (LnAGE) show significant correlation with ICDI and ICWC% respectively, at the 5% level.
144
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH Due to the significant effect of size on disclosure, the partial correlation (controlling for size) was considered to be more appropriate for identifying the marginal effects of other factors that were significantly correlated to level of intellectual capital disclosure.
12 Previous authors suggest multicollinearity becomes a serious problem where correlations exceed 0.8 or VIFs exceed 10 (Haniffa and Cooke, 2005) . Further, the condition indexes, using eigenvalues of the independent variables correlation matrix, were also acceptable with all being below 20. Table 2 Correlation Table 3 presents the results of the descriptive analysis of intellectual capital disclosure by each of the 61 items in the checklist under three categories in various formats. The most frequently disclosed human capital items in text form are number of employees, employee motivation, work-related competence, and other employee features. Other commonly disclosed human capital items include employee relationship, entrepreneurial spirit, development and training, work-related knowledge, employee age, equality, relation, skills, and commitment. Human capital items least disclosed are vocational qualifications, employee productivity and flexibility. In all three formats, the most disclosed structural capital items are business process, technology, R&D, management philosophy, overall infrastructure and distribution network. The strategic importance of customer and supply chain relationships in intellectual capital disclosure is evidenced by the most disclosed items being customers, relationship with suppliers and stakeholders, market presence, customer relationships and market leadership, with over 90% of sampled firms having disclosures of such items.
Results
Descriptive analysis of intellectual capital disclosure
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of each measure of intellectual capital disclosure, at both overall and subcategory levels, and the independent variables for the sample companies are shown in Table 4 .
The mean index (ICDI) is 0.36 with slight variation in the variety of human, structural and relational capital disclosure, and the mean aggregate word count (ICWC) is 10,488 words, accounting for 26.3% of the overall annual report word count (ICWC%). ICDI ranges from 0.16 to 0.56; ICWC ranges from 1,234 to 51,430 words and ICWC% ranges from 8.9% to 42.6%.
13
The rankings of means for human, structural and relational capital disclosure change according to the disclosure measure employed. Structural capital ranks highest (37%) for the disclosure index score, relational capital ranks highest in terms of word count, while structural capital and relational capital are joint highest for focus, each forming 9% of the total annual report word count. In all cases, human capital is in third place, although not far behind the other two. The relational-structuralhuman ranking for word count (38%, 34% and 28% of total intellectual capital respectively) is consistent with findings from prior intellectual capital disclosure studies (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Goh and Lim, 2004; Vandemaele et al., 2005) , demonstrating systematic differences in the level of reporting on intellectual capital elements. If firms focus on the disclosure of those intellectual capital elements that are most value and stakeholder relevant (Vergauwen et al., 2007) , relational capital would seem to be most important in this regard.
The means of corporate governance variables for sample firms indicate that less than half of the board in our sample consists of independent nonexecutive directors (INED). The mean for the cumulative significant shareholdings (excluding significant directors' shareholding) is 30%. The majority (86%) have three or more directors in the audit committee, suggesting compliance with recommended best practice. In addition, the median for the audit committee meeting frequency is four times per year, with 83% of sample companies meeting three or more times during the financial year, in line with the Price Waterhouse (1993) recommendation.
The results for intellectual capital disclosure by the three formats (text, number, graph/picture) are shown in Table 5 . It can be seen that human, structural and relational capitals are disclosed in all three forms in the sample annual reports. Only for structural capital in text form do we observe all possible items disclosed. On average, 43 (70%) of the 61 intellectual capital items in the research instrument have text disclosures. This falls to 29% disclosure in numerical form, and 8% in graph/ picture form, although one firm had one-third of its intellectual capital disclosure in graph/picture form.
Our results confirm that intellectual capital disclosures are still mainly in text form, in line with previous studies (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 2001) . The extensive use of numerical information in intellectual capital disclosure identified in the study is encouraging, supporting the finding of Sujan and Abeysekera (2007) . Table 6 summarises the multiple regression results for all three intellectual capital disclosure measures.
Regression results
The first panel reports the multiple regression results for the ICDI model, producing an adjusted R 2 of 62%. With the exception of role duality (RDUAL), all corporate governance factors examined are significant: size of audit committee (SAC) at the 1% level, and board composition (INED), frequency of audit committee meetings (MAC) and square root of share concentration (SqSCON) at the 5% level. Firm size (LnSA) is significant at the 1% level. Results also show positive relationship between ROA and ICDI, while log of listing age (LnAGE) is negatively associated, both signif-146 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 13 Given that previous studies have adopted different research instruments, it is not possible to make meaningful comparison. Table 3 Number of companies disclosing items in the checklist under three formats 14 Av.
Av.
Av. 
Human capital T N GP WC Relational capital T N GP WC Structural capital T N GP WC
Firm-specific factor
Listing age (AGE) (years) Two companies reported that they had not been notified in accordance with sections 198 to 208 of the Companies Act 1985 of any member who had a notifiable interest (≥3%) in the share capital of the company. One company only has one significant shareholder, who sits on the board of directors, hence has no significant outside shareholding. The explanatory power of the ICWC% model is weaker (adjusted R 2 of 11.2%), as shown in the third panel. INED and LnAGE show significant associations at the 5% level, with SqSCON showing a weak relationship (10% level). All other corporate governance factors are insignificant, but in the direction predicted. Neither LnSA nor ROA is related to ICWC%. Table 7 presents a summary of multiple regression results for each of the three intellectual capital subcategories based on the word count metric: LnHICWC (log of human capital word count); LnSICWC (log of structural capital word count); and LnRICWC (log of relational capital word count). 18 We observe that the two audit committee variables (SAC and MAC) are significantly associated with all three intellectual capital subcategories, confirming our hypothesis of the role these committees play in influencing the level of intellectual capital disclosure in its various forms. In addition, relational capital disclosures are significantly associated with INED and SqSCON; structural capital disclosures are significantly associated with INED, while human capital disclosures are associated with RDUAL, all in the direction hypothesised. Table 8 summarises the associations between the independent variables and intellectual capital disclosure measures, namely, variety (ICDI), volume (ICWC) and focus (ICWC%).
Examination of hypotheses
Board composition was expected to be one of the major corporate governance determinants for intellectual capital disclosure. The significant positive results of all three measures of intellectual capital disclosure, especially for variety (5% level) and volume (1% level), support our hypothesis (H1) that the greater the presence of independent non-executive directors on the board, the greater the intellectual capital disclosure. Detailed analysis at item level (not included) reveals that firms with more independent non-executive directors disclose significantly more human capital items (e.g. employee relations and work-related competence, but not diversity or equality), structural capital items (e.g. management philosophy, corporate culture, innovation, knowledge-based infrastructure, and quality management and improvement), and relational capital items (e.g. market presence, relationships with suppliers, business agreements, and marketing issues). They offer support to arguments based on both agency and resource dependence theories. Table 6 Multiple regression results for ICDI, LnICWC and ICWC% Role duality was not found to influence intellectual capital disclosure and our hypothesis (H2) was rejected. Share ownership concentration showed significant negative associations with all three measures of intellectual capital disclosure as hypothesised, especially by variety (5% level) and volume (1% level). The finding supports our hypothesis (H3) that companies with more concentrated share ownership are less responsive to investors' information costs, since the dominant shareholders typically have regular access to the information they require and hence there is less pressure for intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports. Analysis at intellectual capital subcategory level reveals that the impact of block shareholders is mainly on the volume of relational capital disclosure (e.g. customers, market presence and leadership, customer relationship and acquisition, company awards, public relation, distribution channel, relationship with suppliers and stakeholders, business collaboration and marketing).
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Audit committee size was found to be positively Results support hypothesis (H5) that a positive relationship exists between level of intellectual capital disclosure and frequency of audit committee meetings. This suggests that audit committee activity is an important factor in monitoring management behaviour with regard to reducing information asymmetry through intellectual capital disclosure.
Summary and conclusions
Results based on multiple regression models for the three intellectual capital disclosure measures indicate that, with the exception of role duality, all corporate governance variables together with firm size, profitability and listing age are associated with one or more of the intellectual capital disclosure measures. This is consistent with Keenan and Aggestam's (2001) argument, previously untested, that corporate governance impacts on efficient intellectual capital management, including its communication to stakeholders. The significant positive association for board composition provides evidence for independent directors' function as a monitoring mechanism, which enhances the effectiveness of the board and reduces both agency costs and information asymmetries between principals and agents. Moreover, their breadth of expertise and knowledge heighten the board's awareness of the importance of intellectual capital disclosure, especially structural and relational capital. We also find confirmation of our share concentration, audit committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings hypotheses, underpinned by agency theory arguments. Where share ownership is highly concentrated, smaller shareholders' interests in relation to intellectual capital need to be protected via corporate governance mechanisms, such as greater independence of the board and larger, more active audit committees for better intellectual capital communication.
We argue that, as well as the variety and volume of disclosure, it is meaningful to measure each firm's disclosure focus (ICWC%) to examine the proportion of annual reports devoted to intellectual capital. On average, 26% of annual report disclosures were devoted to intellectual capital; this focus is not size dependent and is greater where firms have a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors and shareholdings are more widely spread.
Our findings indicate that, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, effective corporate governance mechanisms impact positively on the variety, volume (word count) and format (text, numbers, graphs/pictures) of intellectual capital disclosure. Future research could usefully explore the relationships identified in the study in greater depth through organisational case studies.
There are several limitations in this study. First, the disclosure scoring sheet is self-developed, which causes difficulty for comparison with prior studies. Second, the study focuses only on corporate annual reports and future studies may consider other media. Third, there will be other factors that affect companies' intellectual capital disclosure practices that have not been examined in this study. 19 Finally, the study has not attempted to include corporate culture. For example, companies that choose to have good disclosure policies may also choose to operate good corporate governance practices. 19 As with any disclosure study, the problem of endogeneity may exist where corporate governance variables are themselves included in intellectual capital disclosure. For example, increasing the number of independent non-executive directors in relation to executive directors could increase the amount of information on current positions held outside the company by directors available for disclosure. However, this is compensated by the expectation of a reduction in the amount of information about employee relationships (executive directors' years of service), employee development (career path of executive directors in the company), and management capability (executive directors' leadership abilities). As shown in Table  7 , by breaking intellectual capital disclosure down to its subcategories, board composition does not have a significant effect on the volume of human capital disclosure, while there are significant effects on the volume of relational and structural capital disclosures. The problem of endogeneity in this study is not considered significant.
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